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THE CORPUS DELICTI-CONFESSION PROBLEM*
Legal doctrines, while appropriate in one setting, may become a deterrent
to justice when overextended. Unquestioning obedience to precedent is not
necessarily a fulfillment of justice. An illustration of this undesirable result
may be found in the cases involving the corpus delicti issue, particularly as
regards the rule that the corpus delicti must be established independently of
a confession before the confession will be admitted in evidence.
The general corpus delicti doctrine was first expounded by Sir Mathew Hale
when he wrote, "I would never convict any person of murder or manslaughter
unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body found dead."'
The basis for his statement was the well-founded fear that people may be
convicted of imaginary, non-existent crimes.2 Since a criminal trial is, in a
sense, an investigation carried on to determine if the accused perpetrated a
particular criminal act, the necessity of establishing that the act is, in fact,
done seems to be a logical prerequisite to the determination of who did it.
The corpus delicti is, then, the foundation upon which the evidentiary struc-
ture showing who perpetrated the offense is built.3
The courts have developed three distinct views as to what constitutes the
corpus delicti. The first view requires only proof of a particular loss or
injury.4 The second, and apparently the majority view, requires in addition
to this, proof of a criminal act, agency, or cause bringing the loss or injury
into being.5 The third view demands a third element as well: proof that the
accused himself committed the crime.8 By including this third element as a
*By Edward L. Lembitz, now a member of the Illinois bar.
1. 2 Hale P. C. 290.
2. History shows numerous convictions for crimes which were never committed. Hale
cites the case of a man executed for the murder of a person who later returned from a
forced sea voyage. 2 Hale P. C. 290. A man was convicted of the murder of his niece
when she had disappeared under circumstances tending toward the proof that he had
murdered her. Sir Edward Coke writes that the niece had merely run away and returned
after her uncle had been executed. Inst. ch. 140, p. 232. Note also the execution of John
Miles for the murder of William Ridley. Ridley was later found dead in a deep privy
where he had fallen while intoxicated. 2 BEST, EvmENcE, 444 (12th ed. 1922). A list of
uncommitted "murders" can be found in 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §357 (12th ed. 1932).
Requiring proof of corpus delicti is a substantive rule of law to protect the accused from
conviction of a crime not committed. See People v. Mason, 37 Cal. Cr. App.2d 407, 99
P.2d 567 (1940) ; Barnes v. State, 199 Miss. 86, 23 So.2d 405 (1945) ; State v. Hawkins,
165 S.W. 2d 644 (Mo. 1942).
3. State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010 (1938).
4. State v. Potter, 52 Vt. 33, (1"879) ; 7 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE §2072 (3d ed. 1940).
5. People v. Mohr, 24 Cal. Cr. App.2d 580, 75 P.2d 616 (1938); Lowe v. People, 76
Colo. 603, 234 Pac. 169 (1925); State v. Darrah, 60 Idaho 479, 92 P.2d 143 (1939) ;
Warnell v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1952) ; Ward v. State, 222 P.2d 173
(Okla. 1950); Commonwealth v. Coontz, 288 Pa. 74, 135 At. 538 (1927) ; State v. Pienick,
46 Wash. 522, 90 Pac. 645 (1907).
6. State v. Bennett, 6 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1928) ; Commonwealth v. Haley, 359 Pa. 477,
59 A.2d 62 (1948).
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part of the corpus delicti, the prosecution's entire ease must be proven before
the corpus delicti is considered established.
7
If the policy behind the requirement of corpus delicti is stated as the pro-
tection of innocent people from conviction for criminal acts rather than the
prevention of conviction for non-existent crimes, the third view requirement
of proof of the identity of the perpetrator would be as important as the other
elements. 8 However, since protection from convictions for non-existing crimes
is the accepted policy objective, then the identity of the perpetrator is
irrelevant.
The second view of what constitutes corpus delicti cannot be so criticized
in light of the policy. It demands the proof of a crime and no more or less.
The first view, however, can be criticized for requiring proof of less than an
actual crime and thereby failing to provide adequate protection from unwar-
ranted prosecution.
Just as there are varied ideas as to what elements constitute corpus delicti,
there are different views as to the type of evidence required to establish these
elements. The majority of courts say the corpus delicti need not be established
beyond reasonable doubt.9 Some courts describe the necessary proof in terms
of prima facie proof,' 0 while a few demand greater proof." There is a dis-
tinct tendency to insist upon stronger proof when the evidence is circumstan-
tial, and in such cases the courts use terms such as proof which is convincing,' 2
of such a nature as to exclude all uncertainty,' 3 strong and cogent,' 4 unequivo-
cable proof compatible with the nature of the case,' 5 beyond reasonable doubt.' 6
Yet others state that circumstantial evidence is itself sufficient.' 7 If any
principle can be deduced from the numerous cases, it is that the strictness
of the evidence requirement varies with the particular facts of each case.
The formal ingredients of the corpus delicti and the degree of proof neces-
sary for their establishment are empty concepts in and of themselves. Their
substance can only be noted by discerning how the courts have utilized them to
promote justice.
Corpus Delicti in the Absence of a Confession by Accused: The courts
7. 1 WHARTON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §348 (12th ed. 1932) ; see note 4 supra. Compare Han-
cey v. United States, 108 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1940) with Pines v. United States, 123 F.2d 825
(8th Cir. 1941). The Tenth Circuit follows the third view while the Eighth expounds the
second view.
8. In some crimes, such as treason and conspiracy, which consist of intention and are of
a psychological nature, it is impossible to prove the existence of the crime without disclosing
the identity of the perpetrator in the process of the proof. This has been called delicda
facti transeuntis. When traces of the crime are present without any knowledge of the
author, it is known as delicta facti permanentis. See Case of Captain Green and His Crew,
14 How. St. Tr. 1199, 1230 (1705).
9. People v. Borrelli, 392 Ill. 481, 64 N.E.2d 719 (1946) cert. denied, 328 U.S. 845
(1945) ; Phillips v. State, 196 Miss. 194, 16 So.2d 630 (1944) ; also see People v. Rafe, 382
Ill. 588, 48 N.E.2d 367 (1943) (stating that the quantum of proof must vary with the cir-
cumstances of each case).
10. People v. Hart, 46 Cal. Cr. App.2d 230, 115 P.2d 546 (1941) ; People v. Van Scoyoc,
25 Cal. Cr. App.2d 416, 77 P.2d 485 (1938).
11. Wrisper v. State, 193 Ga. 157, 17 S.E.2d 714 (1942); State v. Kindle, 71 Mont. 58,
277 Pac. 65 (1924).
12. United States v. Di Orio, 1'50 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1945); United States v. De Mor-
mand, 149 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1945) cert. denied, 326 U.S. 758; United States v. Adleman,
107 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Petrovick v. United States, 205 U.S. 86 (1906).
13. State v. Sullivan, 34 Idaho 68, 199 Pac. 647 (1921).
14. State v. Williams, 52 N. C. 446 (1860).
15. Lee v. State, 96 Fla. 59, 117 So. 699 (1928).
16. Timmerman v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 445, 17 Pac. 624 (1888).
17. Cooley v. State, 233 Ala. 407, 171 So. 725 (1937).
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seldom talk of corpus delicti in cases where there is no confession. Here, the
corpus delicti will be substantiated by other evidence, since the knowledge
of the existence of a crime must have come from sources apart from the
accused. However, the proof of the corpus delicti is still a necessary part of
the prosecution's case.'8 In the non-confession case the only difference be-
tween holding that the accused should be acquitted because the corpus delicti
has not been proved rather than directing acquittal for failure to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt appears to be in the stigma attaching to the
accused. In the one case he is freed because he cannot be proved guilty of a
crime, and in the other he is in an even better social position because no crime
was proved. This seems too sophisticated a distinction to have substance.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, in cases where there is no confes-
sion, it adds little to speak of lack of proof of the corpus delicti rather than to
consider its proof as but one part of the whole case which has not been estab-
lished beyond reasonable doubt. In all cases, the inadequacy of the evidence
is ultimately in the hands of the jury. Whereas the judge frequently can
direct for the defendant when he believes the corpus delicti has not been
established,' 9 if he cannot or chooses not to do so, the jury still must believe
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This must include belief that
a crime has in fact been committed.2 0
Corpus Delicti and Extra-Judicial Confessions: In early times, confessions
were considered the weakest form of evidence.21 Modern courts, due to the
fear of false confessions, 22 still do not trust them. This distrust is manifested
by a rule of law whereby the confession is believed untrustworthy until the
corpus delicti has been established by evidence other than the confession.
2 3
Such a rule does, of course, foster the policy of the original corpus delicti
requirement, for if the confession alone were believed there would be a possi-
bility of convicting a person of a crime which was never committed. On the
other hand an innocent confessor to an actual crime would be convicted with-
out violating the policy.2 4 However, the courts claim protection is given by
requiring a confession to be corroborated or authenticated before it is ad-
mitted.2
5
18. "The corpus delicti, or the fact that a crime has been committed is an important
element entering into the trial of every person charged with the commission of a crime."
(emphasis added) See 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §346 (12th ed. 1932).
19. In California it is the duty of the judge to advise the jury that the corpus delicti has
not been established, but he can only advise and not instruct. People v. Ward, 145 Cal.
736, 79 Pac. 448 (1905). In Oklahoma the judge must direct or it is reversible error.
Huffman v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. Rep. 476, 119 Pac. 644 (1911). This appears to be the
majority view.
20. 7 WIGMORE §2073.
21. 4 BL. COMM. 357.
22.. See GROSS, CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY §8 (2d ed. 1905); WIGMORE, SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL
PROOF §§273-7 (3d ed. 1937) ; HEALY, PATHOLOGICAL LYING, ACCUSATION AND SWINDLING (Ist
ed. 1915).
23. State v. Benham, 58 Ariz. 129, 118 P.2d 91 (1941) ; Barnes v. State, 199 Miss. 86,
23 S.2d 405 (1945) ; Jenkins v. State, 41 Miss. 582 (1867) ; People v. Fitzgerald, 288 N.Y.
58, 41 N.E. 2d 457 (1942).
24. This would be the result unless evidence tending to show who is the perpetrator
was considered a proper part of the proof of the corpus delicti. However, this would be
reducing the confession to mere cumulative evidence covering what already had been
proven by evidence independent of the confession.
25. The need for corroborating confessions was noted even in early Roman law. An
uncorroborated confession was held to be a semiplena probatio and could not be used to
convict the defendant. See United States v. Dache, 250 F. 566 (2d Cir. 1918); Forte v.
United States, 302 U.S. 220 (1937) (The confession must be corroborated and such
corroboration is insufficient if it tends to merely support the confession without embracing
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If the requirement of corroboration is to guarantee truthfulness, it could be
of various types: (a) matters tending to authenticate the confession, (b) mat-
ters tending to show the confession was sincere, (c) matters tending to sub-
stantiate the confession with respect to (1) participation of the defendant
without reference to the fact of a crime or (2) the fact of a crime without
reference to the participation of the defendant. This last situation (c-2) is
the only one where there is corroboration which tends to establish the corpus
delicti. However, the innocent confessor is not protected by it as much when
he confesses to an actual crime as he would be by other types of corroboration
where his participation may be shown by evidence outside the confession or
where the truthfulness of the confession is shown by facts which go beyond
only establishing a crime.2 6
The majority of courts hold, then, that the corpus delicti cannot be estab-
lished by the confession of the accused, and as a corollary, that the confession
will not be admitted without independent corroboration by proof of the
corpus delicti. A confession'may only establish the guilt of the accused.2 7
Such is the result in the use of the confession during the trial if the corrobora-
tion rule is strictly applied.
It is unquestionable that the law should punish only for crimes actually
committed.28 It seems further without doubt that the acceptance of an uncor-
roborated extra-judicial confession as sufficient in itself to establish the corpus
delicti may result in allowing legal suicide. Nevertheless, does the policy
requiring an independent establishment of the corpus delicti necessarily dic-
tate that a confession may, in effect, only be used to evidence the guilt of the
accused. It seems anomalous that an uncorroborated confession is too unreli-
able to establish the fact that a crime has been committed, and yet is accept-
able to establish the participation of the accused once the corpus delicti has
been proved. Apparently the anomaly is thought removed by the assumption
that if the confession is corroborated to the extent that the corpus delicti is
established, sufficient trustworthiness appears in the confession to give it
efficacy in itself to prove the accused as the perpetrator. But since the patho-
logical liar and the suicide are as likely to confess to an actual crime as to an
imaginary one, and are as deserving of protection in either case, the above
assumption appears unsubstantiated.
Many courts, while outwardly approving the corpus delicti corroboration
rule, have made inroads into it. Some courts allow the confession in as evi-
dence before the corpus delicti has been established.2 9 They assert that the
substantial evidence of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt without the confession).
But see Pearlman v. United States, 10 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1926); UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL
EvDENcE §36 (4th ed. 1935).
26. Judge Learned Hand has expressed doubt in the wisdom of the rule, "That the
rule has in fact any substantial necessity in justice, we are much disposed to doubt . . .
But we should not feel at liberty to disregard a principle so commonly accepted, merely
because it seems to us that such evils as it corrects could be much more flexibly treated by
the judge at the trial. . ." Dache v. United States, 250 F. 566, 571 (ed Cir. 1918).
27. The other two elements under the majority view, a loss or injury and a criminal
act, agency, or cause, and the confession would be equated to any other evidence which
would indicate no more than the identity of the accused.
28. It may be argued that punishment for a crime serves two purposes-to punish the
guilty and to be a warning to others. However, if the corpus delicti has not been legally
established but the public still believes there has been a crime committeed, this second
purpose would be served even if no actual crime had ever been committed.
29. Floyd v. State, 82 Ala. 16, 2 So. 683 (1887); State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 Pac.
1014 (1901).
30. Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897).
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